Mai Kraft, director of the National Cyber Security Centre at the Estonian Information System Authority, has contributed an article to Enterprise Estonia on what keeps a digital society trustworthy. She argues that secure infrastructure is not enough: organisations must take responsibility for the data and services they manage.
In my first months as Estonia’s cyber security chief, one pattern has repeated, and it a tale as old as any sort of security protocol. People get it wrong: the technology is rarely the weak point. The real culprit of breaches and disastrous incidents is elsewhere. The decisions that leadership makes, or avoids, usually are to blame.
In October I wrote a column about five headlines that had appeared in the Estonian media over a few weeks. A university’s online shop had lost customer data. A dentists’ information system had leaked personal identification codes and health records. A pizza chain’s customers were told their details were in a hacker’s hands. A sports federation and a university library web shop followed.
Five organisations shared the same failure: someone who should never have had access found a way in. Of course, none of them was a bank, a ministry or a power grid. But an attacker does not have to choose the most valuable target. Choosing the easiest one is enough. Hackers reportedly took data on 8.8 million people in Denmark and 1.4 million files from Berlin’s city administration, and both ended up on the dark web.
Trust is held by organisations, not by infrastructure
I took over the National Cyber Security Centre at the Estonian Information System Authority in August, after eight years as chief information security officer at a telecoms operator. That has meant seeing the problem from both sides: a state that sets requirements, and a company that has to meet them. Neither role replaces the other.
Estonia is usually described through its services: signing a document, checking a prescription, filing a tax return, all online, most of it taken for granted. What holds that together is not the software. It is people’s willingness to hand their data to an institution and expect it to be handled well, and that willingness is earned in ordinary weeks and can be spent in one.
Trust is distributed, too. No national infrastructure, however well built, secures an ecosystem of thousands of organisations. Every institution, company and association that collects personal data or runs a digital service holds part of the same trust, and the weakest of them sets the level for the rest.
Most incidents are not attacks
The numbers show how much of this work has little to do with adversaries. RIA recorded 10,185 incidents with an impact in Estonia’s cyberspace in 2025, the first five-digit year on record, against 6,515 in 2024 and 3,314 in 2023. Fraud accounts for 4,524 of them and phishing for 2,809. 59 were data breaches, and scams alone cost people in Estonia €29 million last year.
Only 95 were denial-of-service attacks. Incidents from other causes were almost ten times as numerous, and most had nobody behind them: human error, configuration mistakes, faults in software and hardware. In May a fault during maintenance on East Tallinn Central Hospital’s IT systems left servers unable to reach their data. The hospital declared a crisis, postponed operations and sent patients arriving at the emergency department elsewhere. Services came back in two and a half hours.
What prevents days like that does not make the news: knowing which systems you hold and how critical each one is, limiting who can reach them, reading logs, keeping backups that actually restore, testing a change before it goes live.
Leadership does not require technical expertise
No board member needs to understand every vulnerability. They need to understand the risk, decide what resources it deserves and know who is accountable when something fails. Those three decisions separate the organisation that recovers from the one that becomes a headline, and none of them can be delegated to a supplier.
They are concrete. Whether software is updated, whether access rights are reviewed, whether an incident response plan exists and has been tested, whether anyone is authorised to take a service offline at two in the morning: each of these is a management decision before it is a technical one.
Estonian law now frames it that way. Amendments transposing the EU’s NIS2 directive took effect on 1 January 2026, expanding the number of companies and institutions introducing personal liability for board members and raising potential fines to €10 million or 2% of annual turnover.
What happens afterwards matters as much
No organisation can promise it will never be breached. What counts then is preparation, the speed of the response and how openly the organisation talks about what happened. A hospital that restores its systems within hours, tells patients what it knows and explains what it changed keeps more trust than one that stays silent and hopes the story passes.
Incidents have to be reported, and in Estonia the route is CERT-EE, which has handled reports for 20 years. Reporting is how the state learns what to warn others about, and hiding an incident usually costs more trust than the incident itself.
The volume is worth keeping in proportion. Kristjan Hinn, head of information security at North Estonia Medical Centre, told ERR recently that the hospital faces hundreds of thousands of attempted attacks a month, investigates 200 to 300 incidents and has to act on about a tenth of them. Attacks are routine even where defences work. What varies is whether anyone is ready for them.
What the state can do, and what it cannot
The role of my agency in Estonia’s cyber security is to set requirements, conduct oversight and give advice. We run the free cyber test that 426 institutions have adopted and almost 32,000 people have used, and we publish a guide for companies and warnings about current scams on itvaatlik.ee. ith grid operator Elering we ran an exercise in which participants faced a cyberattack threatening the country’s entire electricity supply, and heard the sentence “in the worst case, we could be without electricity for days”. An operations centre opened in June 2025 now watches Estonia’s cyberspace and our own services in real time. With Enterprise Estonia we created an innovation grant of €60,000 to €100,000 for cyber security companies, co-financed by the European Cybersecurity Competence Centre.
None of that takes responsibility away from an organisation. The state can set requirements, provide guidance and support companies. It cannot sit in a boardroom and make the decisions that keep a service running.
Start with yourself
Supervision shows the same failures again and again. Organisations do not know which assets they hold or how critical each one is. Every risk is rated medium. Documentation is produced to satisfy an auditor rather than to describe how the work is done. Buying a cloud or security service is assumed to move the responsibility with it.
We put it this way in our annual report: a mature organisation understands what it does, why it does it and who is responsible. An immature one treats symptoms rather than causes.
That is the lesson I would offer any country building or modernising its digital state. Digital transformation and cyber security have to move at the same pace, and the second is not a project a government completes on everyone’s behalf. When the next incident is reported, the useful question is not only what happened to them, but whether something that will produce the next headline is already under way in our own systems, and who is deciding what to do about it.
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